The robot-mower race is half seawater, half flame. As of 22 September, domestic funding in the category had reached nearly RMB 1.6 billion this year. In May, LeRobot listed on the Hong Kong exchange, surging 127.62 per cent on debut with a market capitalisation that touched HK$20 billion and a retail over-subscription of 6,707 times.
On the other side of the ledger, Britain’s Kingdom Technologies entered liquidation, Orbbec cut its whole-device ODM business, Hangzhou Superman remains in bankruptcy proceedings, and Oasa, which had raised nearly RMB 100 million and oversold on crowdfunding, has stopped operating.
The market is still growing. In 2025 global mowing-robot shipments reached 1.992 million units, up 63.8 per cent year on year. Boundary-wire-free smart units shipped 1.318 million, up 182.4 per cent. The industry expects the global smart-mowing market to expand from RMB 6.1 billion in 2024 to RMB 47.6 billion by 2029.
Money still flows in and the market still grows, yet the first cohort has already been squeezed out. The fallen firms share a trait: the hardware was largely built, some had orders, some oversold on crowdfunding, some even shipped. What actually sank them was the older manufacturing muscle that comes after the prototype, mass production, channel, after-sales and cash flow.
Robot mowers have not entered winter. They have simply left the stage where merely building the thing made it valuable.
Editor’s note: This is an adapted translation of the original OFweek report. It has been trimmed and restructured for readability for an international business audience. The full original (in Chinese) is at https://robot.ofweek.com/2026-10/ART-8321202-12003-30707642.html.