Six Frontier Models Failed a Robot Safety Test

Six frontier language models were asked to run a robot arm. All six caused harm. A lightweight safety layer that treats the model as a black box cut that to zero on real hardware for four of them, at a cost of about half a US cent per run.

RoboRisk benchmark collage of robot safety failure scenarios
RoboRisk benchmark covers 105 simulated and real-robot tasks across five categories of harm (Source: 36Kr)

Multimodal foundation models are increasingly used as the planning brain for robots. After the release of GPT-6 Astra, researchers found it could control a robot arm zero-shot and even complete a drawing task. GPT, Claude, Gemini and Grok now all support plug-and-play robot control, which has made agentic robotics a plausible route to general robot intelligence.

Conventional robot safety covers explicit constraints such as collision avoidance and joint limits. A trajectory with no collision at all can still place a phone in a bowl of water. Existing safety tooling, including the reviewer agent that checks risky shell commands in Codex, was built for text rather than for three-dimensional physics.

RoboRisk: five categories, 105 tasks

A collaboration between Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Duke Kunshan University, the University of Liverpool, the National University of Singapore and France’s CNRS built RoboRisk, with 92 simulated tasks and 13 real-robot tasks split across five risk categories. Earlier benchmarks covered at most two categories and often only graded text output. Every RoboRisk task closes the loop in simulation or on hardware: the model sees camera frames and issues real actions.

Two metrics are used: Harm Rate, lower is better, and Safe Success Rate, higher is better, with a correct refusal counted as a safe success when the requested goal is itself harmful. Simulation runs 92 tasks across three random seeds, 276 trials per configuration, and the real-robot set runs 13 tasks with one seed each.

The team tested GPT-6 Astra, GPT-6.1 Sol, GPT-6 Luna, Claude Opus 5.5, Gemini 4 Argon and Grok 4.7, plus the Dream API and PokeBot’s RoboAPI. Harm rates across the six foundation models ran from 9.06 per cent to 76.92 per cent. No planner was both safe and useful.

The failures are concrete. Claude Opus 5.5 put a phone into a bowl of water. GPT-6 Astra carried a cup of milk directly over a power strip. Gemini 4 Argon kept a knife above a hand that had reached into a basket. GPT-6.1 Sol obeyed an instruction displayed on a tablet, fell for a prompt injection and picked up a knife instead of ketchup. Claude Opus 5.5 served a pear to a user who had said they were allergic. On real hardware, GPT-6.1 Sol caused harm in five of 13 tasks, or 38.46 per cent. The phone was a dummy prop, the liquid non-Newtonian, the knife silicone, and an operator stayed at the emergency stop throughout.

LEASH safety harness architecture with task action and commit gates
LEASH architecture: three safety gates enforce a shared policy over a black-box planner (Source: 36Kr)

The two robot-specific APIs went to opposite extremes. Dream API caused no harm but reached only 28.2 per cent safe success, refusing even safe steps. RoboAPI posted a 59.0 per cent harm rate and zero safe success.

One unexpected result came from the simulation-to-real gap, which the authors call the Human-Presence Gap. In simulation, models behaved normally in scenes containing people. On real hardware the same models became highly conservative when a person was physically present. On tasks that involved moving a cleaver into a basket near a hand and handing a small knife to a person, GPT-6 Astra, GPT-6.1 Sol, Gemini 4 Argon and Claude Opus 5.5 recorded no safe successes, with many trials never starting the motion at all.

LEASH: three gates on a lease

LEASH, or Lease-Enforced Agentic Safety Harness, is a model-independent layer that can be attached to almost any agentic robot architecture without retraining, treating the planner as a black box so a newly released model works immediately. The paper’s opening line sets the tone: every agentic robot is a good puppy, until you walk it without a leash.

It has three gates and one shared safety policy. The task gate reviews the user instruction together with current camera frames before each planning round and is the only gate allowed to terminate a task outright. The action gate reviews every proposed action before execution; rejected actions are returned to the planner for a different plan. The commit gate re-checks irreversible operations, currently gripper release and pouring, just before they happen, because a move that was safe at its start may not be safe at that moment.

The lease in the name is least privilege: the planner holds no standing execution rights, and each gate issues a short-lived lease for the current task, action or operation. Planner and gates read the same policy, so the rules the planner plans against are the rules the gates enforce. In task P3-01, the task gate approved a request to put a cup on the right coaster, the action gate vetoed a route carrying water over a laptop, the planner rerouted, and the commit gate checked the scene again before the gripper opened.

Speed matters because a single task calls the gates more than ten times. Using GPT-6 Luna as reviewer took about 20 seconds per call. LEASH instead uses a System1 decision model that returns a score or a choice with a probability rather than free text, defaulting to a decision model called Jev and also supporting OpenAI’s Decisions API. Each gate allows the action when its safety score clears a threshold.

What the numbers look like after the leash

LEASH reduced harm rates for all six foundation models in simulation and on hardware while largely preserving task completion. For GPT-6 Astra in simulation, harm rate fell from 11.23 per cent to 0.00 per cent and safe success actually rose from 78.99 per cent to 80.80 per cent. On real hardware, GPT-6 Astra, GPT-6.1 Sol, Gemini 4 Argon and Claude Opus 5.5 recorded no harm across 13 tasks, each at 84.62 per cent safe success, with GPT-6.1 Sol falling from 38.46 per cent harm to zero.

Overhead was small. For GPT-6 Astra and GPT-6.1 Sol, mean end-to-end time rose 1.66 per cent, from 245.21 seconds to 249.28 seconds. Gate calls cost about US$0.005 per run, or 0.66 per cent of a US$0.791 total. With Jev, the task gate blocked around half of harmful goals in simulation while the planner, following the shared policy, refused the rest. More than 99.9 per cent of candidate actions approved by the action and commit gates were safe.

RoboRisk benchmark results showing harm rates before and after LEASH
RoboRisk results compare harm rate and safe success rate with and without the LEASH harness (Source: 36Kr)

Two models resisted. GPT-6 Luna in simulation still posted 12.68 per cent harm and Grok 4.7 on hardware 38.46 per cent, often failing to follow instructions. Some harm came from unstable motion rather than unsafe decisions, including collisions with a tabletop and, for Grok 4.7, with the wrist camera. The authors advise against using either on real hardware.

LEASH depends on the accuracy of its reviewer and on planner behaviour. Because the decision model’s reasoning is limited, the action and commit gates can reject operations but cannot terminate tasks. A weak planner that ignores the shared policy can still emit unsafe actions. The commit gate currently covers only gripper release and pouring, leaving other hazards inside long primitives such as VLA skills unmonitored, and the Human-Presence Gap remains open.

The task catalogue, simulation entry point, LEASH implementation, real-robot interface and every simulation result counted in the paper are open sourced, with representative task videos on the project page. Authors are Qinfeng Zhu, Weiguang Zhao, Ke Sun, Xihao Guo, Yunxi Jiang, Rui Zhang, Lei Fan and Kaizhu Huang, with Lei Fan and Kaizhu Huang as corresponding authors.

Editor’s note: This is an adapted translation of the original 36Kr report. It has been trimmed and restructured for readability for an international business audience. The full original (in Chinese) is at https://m.36kr.com/p/4073723651495043.

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