Two exit routes for Chinese humanoid robot companies narrowed in the same window, and the money that entered this year is now priced against both of them.
The IPO channel narrowed first
On 3 November, foreign media reported that the China Securities Regulatory Commission had asked large securities firms and banks, at a closed-door meeting, to slow their IPO business. Projects already in review could proceed. New filings were not being accepted.
That reading had reached the robotics industry within days. The working assumption among founders and their bankers is now that a robot-adjacent company will not be pushed quickly toward a listing.
Hong Kong does not solve it. A mainland company listing in the territory must complete the CSRC offshore listing filing process and separately submit to HKEX review. A different exchange does not place the company outside mainland supervision.
The backdoor was already shut
AgiBot was the case the market watched. The company acquired control of Shangwei New Materials, and the transaction was treated as the model for capitalising a robot developer through a listed shell.
In October 2025, Shangwei New Materials disclosed that AgiBot had no plan or arrangement to pursue a backdoor listing within three years. If the sector leader cannot complete that route, smaller companies will not attempt it soon.
Old shares are already discounted
Institutions have been selling secondary stakes in robot companies at a discount. Securities Times reported on 29 October that over the previous two months, old shares in embodied intelligence companies had frequently changed hands at 65 to 80 per cent of the previous round’s valuation.
Liquidity is the problem rather than price. Once the exit is understood to be difficult, the bid disappears, and the discount stops clearing the market.
The comparison with the first half of the year is stark. According to iiMedia, China recorded 172 embodied intelligence financing events in the first half of 2026, with total funding of RMB 109.174 billion. Several leading companies carried valuations above RMB 20 billion.
Founders carry the tail risk
Much of this year’s funding carried performance guarantees, including personal and corporate joint liability. If a company fails, founders can be required to buy back investor equity with their own money.
Rounds of RMB 1 billion or more have become routine, and few founders can fund a buyback at that scale.
The visible spending pattern also changed. Some founders spent RMB 300,000 to RMB 500,000 on a single sponsored article for capital-markets positioning.
What survives
A quieter group of companies entered this cycle with RMB 100 to 200 million of revenue and valuations around RMB 2 billion. During the boom they looked underfunded and undervalued against peers raising several hundred million at valuations in the tens of billions.
The position reverses when the cycle turns. Less capital raised means less capital consumed. A lower valuation means a lower earnings expectation and a smaller organisation to carry. Real revenue means the company can keep operating when the capital market stops paying.
The long-term case for humanoid robotics is intact. The case for any individual company is not the same thing.
Editor’s note: This is an adapted translation of the original 36Kr report. It has been trimmed and restructured for readability for an international business audience. The full original (in Chinese) is at https://36kr.com/p/4060357426860936.